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Tax Transplants and Local Culture:
A Comparative Study of the Chinese
and Canadian GAAR
Jinyan Li*
This Article discusses, compares, and analyzes the transplanted
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in China and the GAAR in
Canada. It demonstrates the similarity between the GAARs on paper
and the divergence between the GAARs in action. It argues that the
divergence is largely attributable to the differences between Canada
and China in the general legal system, legal institutions, judicial and
taxpayer attitudes towards tax avoidance, and the ideology of tax
avoidance.
INTRODUCTION
The transplantation of tax laws from one country to another commonly
occurs around the world. It may range from the wholesale adoption of entire
systems of tax law to the importation of a single rule. The best-known
example of a systematic transplantation is perhaps the adoption of the
European value-added tax (VAT) by over 100 countries. With the exception
of the systematic transplantation of income tax law due to colonization
(such as the Inland Revenue Code in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Israel),
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benefited from comments made by many friends and colleagues. The author thanks
participants at the NYU seminar and the Prato conference. Special thanks are
due to David Rosenbloom, Lee Sheppard, Tsilly Dagan, Rick Krever, Assaf
Likhovski, Yoram Margalioth, Anat Rosenberg, Li Jin, Adam Chodrow, Carlo
Garbarino, Kathryn James, Marjorie Kornhauser, Sagit Leviner, Ajay Mehrotra,
Michael Livingston and Aya Shalom. The author thanks He Huang and Leo (Xin)
Xu for their excellent research assistance. The author also thanks the editors of
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income tax transplantation has largely been rule-specific. Examples are the
transfer pricing rules, the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and
thin capitalization rules. Tax transplantation occurs across legal cultures.
Even among the OECD countries, there is a mix of civil law traditions,
Anglo-Saxon common law traditions, and Asian legal traditions. Such
cross-cultural transplantation raises interesting questions about the actual
function of apparently similar rules in countries with different institutional
and cultural backgrounds.
There is an emerging body of literature on comparative taxation,' tax
transplants,2 and tax culture.3 This Article contributes to that literature by
I E.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (2004); VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW (2003);
RICHARD M. BIRD & PIEERE-PASCAL GENDRON, THE VAT IN DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES (2007); RICHARD DOERNBERG, Luc HINNEKENS, WALTER
HELLERSTEIN & JINYAN LI, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
TAXATION (2001); JINYAN Li, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2003); NABIL ORow, GENERAL ANTI-
AVOIDANCE RULES: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (2000).
2 For further discussion on tax transplants, see Carlo Garbarino, Comparative Taxation
and Legal Theory: The Tax Design Case ofthe Transplant ofGeneralAnti-Avoidance
Rules, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 765 (2010); Carlo Garbarino, Tax Transplants
and Circulation of Tax Model (Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356122; Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally
Specific? Lessons from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 725 (2010); Michael Walpole & Chris Evans, Whitehall
to Wagga Wagga: TheLegacy of UK Tax Law in Australia, 2008 BRIT. TAxREV. 205;
Benjamin Alarie & David G. Duff, The Legacy of UK Tax Concepts in Canadian
Income Tax Law, 2008 BRIT. TAX REV. 228; Michael Littlewood, The Legacy of UK
Tax Law in Hong Kong, 2008 BRIT. TAX REv. 253; Ivor Richardson, The Legacy
of UK Tax Law Concepts on the Tax Laws of New Zealand, 2008 BRIT. TAX REV.
285; E.B. Broomberg, The Legacy of UK Tax Lav in South Africa, 2008 BRIT.
TAX REV. 291. For the general literature on legal transplants, see ALAN WATSON,
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1993); P.W. Schroth,
Legal Transplantation, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 47 (1986); Katharina Pistor & Daniel
Berkowitz, Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 347 (Peter
K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003). There is an emerging body of literature on
legal transplants to China. See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in
Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006); Ni Zhu, A Case
Study of Legal Transplant: The Possibility of Efficient Breach in China, 36 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 1145 (2005).
3 The pioneer in this field is Michael Livingston. See Michael A. Livingston, Law,
Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 119 (2005).
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examining one of the most recent tax transplants to China - the General
Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) enacted in 2008. The GAAR transplant to
China occurs across legal cultures.4 The Canadian legal system, which I use
as an example ofthe Western sources ofthe GAAR adopted in China, is part of
an Anglo-Saxon system, featuring a strong tradition ofjudge-made law. The
Chinese system has its own traditional values and features, imported Western
ideas, and is generally closer to the civil law system. The GAAR transplant
is thus an ideal case for a comparative study. In this Article I demonstrate that
while the GAAR in Canada and China may be similar on paper, the GAAR
in action is very different. I present a number of institutional and cultural
differences as possible influencing factors for such divergence.
Following this Introduction, Part I provides a brief overview of the
GAAR provision in Canada and China and shows the similarity between the
two provisions. Part II highlights the areas of divergence of the GAAR in
action. These range from the problem of avoidance addressed by the GAAR
to the motivations and application of the GAAR. Part III examines the
differences between Canada and China in terms of the general legal system,
legal institutions, judicial and taxpayer attitudes towards tax avoidance, and
the ideology of tax avoidance. Part IV concludes the Article with some
observations about the implications of this research for the comparative
study of taxation and tax culture.
4 For an overview of legal cultures, see Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington,
Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for
Comparative Law, 47 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 495 (1998).
5 PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL
CULTURE (2001); Zou KEYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARD THE RULE OF
LAW (2006); JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA'S LEGAL SOUL: THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL
IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT (2009); Wulan Lei, ZhongGuo fa Iv wen hua
bian qian ji te dian [Changes of Legal Culture in China and Its Characteristics],
23 J. POL. Sci. & L. 72 (2006); Roger Des Forges & Qiang Fang, Were Chinese
Rulers Above the Law? Toward a Theory of the Rule of Law in China from Early
Times to 1949 CE (Buffalo Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2006-06, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 896910; Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or
Is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 654 (2003); Randall
Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About Law and Development? Describing,
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MilH. J. INT'L L. 823
(2005-06).
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I. THE GAAR ON PAPER
A. "Transplant"
A general anti-avoidance rule has been introduced in a number of countries,
including Australia, Canada, Hong Kong SAR, Italy, Germany, New Zealand
and South Africa, to combat a growing problem of tax avoidance.6 It
generally applies when an avoidance transaction technically complies with
the text of a tax statute, but offends the legislative intent or purpose. As
illustrated in the Canadian context, the GAAR is generally introduced when
specific anti-avoidance rules orjudicial anti-avoidance rules are considered
inadequate. Although the specific wording of the GAAR differs from country
to country, the general framework and goal are more or less the same. The
Chinese GAAR is a tax transplant because China imported this rule,' although
not necessarily from Canada alone. Chinese drafters considered precedents
from various countries before settling on a rule that suited Chinese needs. The
Canadian GAAR is used as an example of Western GAARs.
On paper, both GAARs apply only to "abusive" avoidance transactions
and authorize the tax authorities to deny the tax benefit sought by the
taxpayer.' The meaning of "abusive avoidance" given by the Canadian courts
and the Chinese State Administration of Taxation (SAT) strives to capture
transactions that violate the object and purpose of the legislation.
B. The Canadian GAAR
The Canadian GAAR provision is found in section 245 of the Income Tax
Act.9 The key elements read as follows:
6 For an overview of the GAAR in various countries, see TAX AVOIDANCE AND
THE RULE OF LAW (Graeme S. Cooper ed., 1997); Chris Charles Evans, Barriers
to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments in Common Law
Jurisdictions, 73 H.K. L.J. 103 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969554.
7 Houlu Yang, New Developments in the General Anti-Abuse Rules and the Impact
on International Tax Planning, 3 ASIAN-PAC. TAX BULL. 176, 176-82 (2009).
8 There are also some differences between the Canadian and the Chinese GAAR. The
most notable difference is the legislative sources. While the Canadian GAAR has
a single legislative source, i.e., the Income Tax Act, the Chinese GAAR has three
legislative sources, i.e., the Enterprise Income Tax Law, the Enterprise Income Tax
Regulations, and the SAT's Special Measures. Another difference is that the Chinese
GAAR provides examples of targeted avoidance transactions, whereas the Canadian
law does not.
9 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1.
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Section 245(2):
Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences
to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances
in order to deny a tax benefit that, but for this section, would
result, directly or indirectly, from that transaction or from a series
of transactions that includes that transaction.
Section 245(3) defines the term "avoidance transaction" to mean any
transaction:
(a) that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a
tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to
have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes
other than to obtain the tax benefit; or
(b) that is part of a series of transactions, which series, but for this
section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the
transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or
arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax
benefit.
Section 245(4):
[The GAAR] applies to a transaction only if it may reasonably be
considered that the transaction
(a) would, if this Act were read without reference to this section, result
directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of any one or more
of this [Income Tax] Act [or other tax statutes], or
(b) would result directly or indirectly in an abuse having regard to
those provisions, other than this section, read as a whole.
The meaning of the GAAR has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in three cases: Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co. v. Canada,10 Mathew
v. Canada," and Lipson v. Canada.12 The Court states that the GAAR applies
where: (1) there is a tax benefit resulting from a transaction or part of a
series of transactions; (2) the transaction is an avoidance transaction in the
sense that it cannot be said to have been reasonably undertaken or arranged
primarily for a bonafide purpose other than to obtain a tax benefit; and (3)
there was abusive tax avoidance in the sense that it cannot be reasonably
10 Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co. v. Canada (Canada Trustco (SCC)), [2005] 2 S.C.R.
601.
11 Mathew v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 643.
12 Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3.
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concluded that a tax benefit would be consistent with the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer. If it is unclear whether
there has been abusive tax avoidance, the benefit of the doubt goes to the
taxpayer. The fact that an avoidance transaction lacks economic substance
does not, on its own, render it abusive for the purpose of the GAAR.13
The Supreme Court of Canada has not provided any clear line between
abusive avoidance and non-abusive avoidance transactions. In the Canada
Trustco case, a factually complex but conceptually straightforward type of
cross-border leveraged leasing transaction was found to be non-abusive. 4
In Mathew, a "retail tax shelter" that was designed to transfer business
losses from a bankrupt corporation to individual investors through the use of
partnerships was found to be abusive. The Court was split (4/3) in applying
the GAAR in Lipson to a series of transactions designed to enable a married
couple to effectively deduct interest expenses on a home mortgage (which
13 The Supreme Court of Canada did not reject the relevance of economic substance,
but did not give it much weight either. In Canada Trustco (SCC), the Court stated:
Whether the transactions were motivated by any economic, commercial,
family or other non-tax purpose may form part of the factual context that
the courts may consider in the analysis of abusive tax avoidance allegations
under s. 245(4). However, any finding in this respect would form only one
part of the underlying facts of a case, and would be insufficient by itself to
establish abusive tax avoidance. The central issue is the proper interpretation
of the relevant provisions in light of their context and purpose.
Canada Trustco (SCC), [2005] 2 S.C.R., para.66. For further discussion on economic
substance in Canada, see Jinyan Li, Economic Substance: Drawing the Line Betveen
Legitimate Tax Minimization andAbusive Tax Avoidance, 54 CAN. TAX J. 23 (2006);
Brian J. Arnold & Jinyan Li, ChiefJustice Bowman: Substance over Form, 57 CAN.
TAX J. (forthcoming 2009).
14 The facts of the Canada Trustco (SCC) case are summarized as follows:
Briefly stated, on December 17, 1996, the respondent, with the use of its own
money and a loan of approximately $100 million from the Royal Bank of
Canada ("RBC"), purchased trailers from Transamerica Leasing Inc. ("TLI")
at fair market value of $120 million. CTMC [Canada Trustco] leased the
trailers to Maple Assets Investments Limited ("MAIL") who in turn subleased
them to TLI, the original owner. TLI then prepaid all amounts due to MAIL
under the sublease. MAIL placed on deposit an amount equal to the loan for
purposes of making the lease payments and a bond was pledged as security to
guarantee a purchase option payment to CTMC at the end of the lease. These
transactions allowed CTMC to substantially minimize its financial risk. They
were also accompanied by financial arrangements with various other parties,
not relevant to this appeal.
Canada Trustco (SCC), [2005] 2 S.C.R., para.3.
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were not deductible if the money was borrowed to directly finance the
purchase of the home).
C. The Chinese GAAR
A GAAR is found in Article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law: "If an
enterprise enters into any business arrangement without bona fide commercial
purposes that result in a reduction of taxable revenue or income, the tax
authority is entitled to make adjustments based on reasonable methods." 6
The term "business arrangements without bona fide commercial purposes"
is defined under Article 120 of the Enterprise Income Tax Regulations to
refer to "arrangements whose primary purpose is to reduce, avoid or defer tax
payments."
There is no case law interpreting the meaning of the GAAR. The
SAT issued a circular on the implementation of anti-avoidance rules
(the "Anti-Avoidance Circular").' The term "tax avoidance arrangements"
is defined to include those that result in an "abuse of tax incentives, abuse
of tax treaties, abuse of a company's legal form, or avoidance of tax through
using a tax haven, and other arrangements without bona fide commercial
purposes."" The SAT circular also lists a number of factors to be considered in
determining the application ofthe GAAR, which include: "form and substance
of the arrangement, conclusion time and execution period of the arrangement,
implementation method of the arrangement, relationship between each step
15 Qi ye suo de shui fa [Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated at the 5th Session
of the 10th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Mar. 16,
2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited July 26, 2009) (P.R.C.).
16 Qi ye suo de shui fa shi shi tiao li [The Implementation Regulations of the Enterprise
Income Tax Law of People's Republic China] art. 121 (promulgated by the State
Council at the 197th executive meeting, Nov. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited July 26, 2009) (P.R.C.) provides:
When the tax authorities make special tax adjustments for enterprises in
accordance with provisions of tax laws and regulations, they shall impose
interest charges for the underpaid tax computed on a daily basis from June I
following the tax year to which the tax is attributed, through the date of tax
payment. The aforementioned interest charges shall not be deducted when
computing taxable income.
17 Te bie na shui tiao zheng shi shi ban fa [Measures for the Implementation of
the Special Tax Adjustment (trial)] (promulgated by the State Administration of
Taxation, Jan. 10, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2009). As explained further below, the SAT
circular has the force of law in China. Chinese courts do not challenge the SAT's
interpretation of the tax law or tax regulations.
18 Id. art. 92.
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or part of the arrangement, changes in financial performance of each party
involved in the arrangement, and tax consequences of the arrangement." 19
The GAAR authorizes the tax administration to re-characterize the nature
of a tax avoidance arrangement based on business substance and deny the
taxpayer any tax benefit obtained from the tax avoidance arrangement. For
example, the tax authorities will deny the existence of a corporation without
economic substance, particularly those established in tax havens and which
result in tax avoidance of their associated or unassociated parties. 20
II. THE GAAR IN ACTION - DIVERGENCE
While the GAAR in Canada and China appears similar on paper they
diverge greatly in terms of the problems addressed, motivations behind their
enactment, application and effect. In this Part of the Article I examine these
areas of divergence.
A. "Tax Avoidance"
In Canada the concept of "tax avoidance" is well accepted. In virtually
everything a taxpayer does he or she takes into account tax consequences.
Tax planning leads to tax avoidance. Tax avoidance "is not a dirty word."2
Tax "avoidance" must be distinguished from tax "evasion". Evasion involves
a deliberate breach of the Income Tax Act, by, for example, failing to file a
return, failing to report all taxable income, deducting non-existent expenses,
or concealing or falsifying other relevant information. Evasion is illegal, and
is subject to both civil and criminal penalties. Avoidance differs from evasion
in that it is legal. It does not involve fraud, concealment or any other illegal
measure. What it does involve is the ordering of one's affairs in such a way as
to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable.
Avoidance presupposes that the taxpayer has a choice as to the ordering
of his or her affairs, and the taxpayer chooses the course that would
minimize tax liability. There are different forms of tax avoidance, ranging
from taking advantage of a tax relief, such as deductions for retirement
savings or a capital gains exemption for home ownership, to the use of
19 Id art. 93.
20 Id. art. 94.
21 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. The Queen (Canada Trustco (TCC)), [2003] 4
C.T.C. 2009, para. 57.
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tax-efficient structures, to sophisticated tax arbitrage arrangements and tax
shelters.22 Tax avoidance transactions are designed to take advantage of the
inconsistencies and gaps that exist within the Income Tax Act (and across
national tax systems in the case of international transactions) as well as tax
incentive provisions. Until the enactment ofthe GAAR in Canada in 1988, tax
avoidance was not further distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable
or abusive avoidance. Now the "GAAR draws a line."23 As discussed below,
the scope of "abusive avoidance" has been defined very restrictively by the
Canadian courts.
In China, the concept of tax avoidance is relatively new. By contrast,
the terms "tax evasion," "tax resistance" and "tax revolt" are as old as
the Chinese tax system. Tax avoidance was not regarded as a serious
issue by the SAT until 1998, which was designated as the "year of anti-
avoidance." The distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance is not
clear. Chinese literature and official publications often conflate the two into
a single category of "tax evasion/avoidance." 24 The extent of the problem
is often based on circumstantial evidence. For example, a large percentage
of companies receiving foreign direct investment (FDI) that sustain perennial
losses in China not only continue to invest in China, but also expand their
operations. One explanation for this "unnatural" phenomenon is tax avoidance
- the losses exist on "paper" as a result of tax planning strategies. 25 Typical
tax planning strategies involve taking advantage of tax incentives offered
22 For a general discussion of tax avoidance in Canada, see Brian J. Arnold, The
Long, Slo, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule, 52 CAN. TAX J.
488 (2004); PETER HOGG, JOANNE MAGEE & JINYAN Li, PRINCIPLES OF CANADIAN
INCOME TAX LAW ch. 20 (6th ed. 2006); TAX AVOIDANCE IN CANADA AFTER CANADA
TRUSTCO AND MATHEW (David Duff & Henry Erlichman eds., 2007); WILLIAM 1.
INNES, PATRICK J. BOYLE & JOEL A. NITIKMAN, THE ESSENTIAL GAAR MANUAL:
POLICIES, PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (Carrie Shimkofsky ed., 2006); ALAN M.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., GAAR INTERPRETED: THE GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE
(2006).
23 Canada Trustco (TCC), [2003] 4 C.T.C., para.16.
24 For example, in 2008 there were twenty three corporations reassessed for additional
tax payment in excess of millions of yuan. No evidence was given as to whether the
taxpayers were committing tax avoidance or evasion. All that was important was
that more taxes were assessed. Editorial Note, Wo guo fan bi shuijin rut xinjie duan
[A New Era of Chinese Anti Tax Avoidance], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU BAO [CHINA TAX
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to foreign investors.2 6 The concept of abusive tax avoidance was virtually
nonexistent until the introduction of the GAAR.
As such, while "tax avoidance" is a well-entrenched part of the Canadian
tax landscape, it is new in China. In Canada, the general assumption is that
tax avoidance is acceptable unless it is made specifically unacceptable
through specific anti-avoidance rules or the GAAR. Tax avoidance is
clearly distinguished from tax evasion. In China, the opposite assumption is
generally made. Tax avoidance is often closely associated with tax evasion.
B. Motivations for Enacting the GAAR
The tax administrations in both Canada and China consider some types of
tax avoidance transactions to be unacceptable as they threaten the integrity
of the tax system, erode substantive equality and erode the tax base. Enacting
the GAAR was motivated to combat abusive tax avoidance. However, the
specific "triggers" for enacting the GAAR were different. The Canadian
GAAR was reactive in order to overrule adverse court decisions, while the
Chinese GAAR was proactive, signaling the types of transactions that would
be attacked. The Canadian GAAR reflects a "bottom up" approach, whereas
the Chinese is "top down."
The Canadian Parliament enacted the GAAR in 1988, principally in
response to Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen." In that case, the taxpayer
transferred the business losses of one subsidiary to another subsidiary for
tax purposes through a series of transactions on paper. The Income Tax Act
treats each corporation as a separate entity and does not generally allow a
consolidation of losses between related companies. The taxpayer achieved
consolidation by selling the profit-making business to the loss company and
then appointing the profit-making company to manage the business as an
agent. There are specific anti-avoidance rules, but the Supreme Court of
Canada found these rules inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court relied on the
number and variety of these specific anti-avoidance measures that were in
existence at the time to buttress its conclusion that the Court of its own
motion should not create a business purpose test that had not been enacted
by Parliament. Since none of the specific anti-avoidance measures caught
26 Until 2008, most of the tax incentives were available only to "foreign" investment,
which led to the phenomenon of "round tripping" - Chinese investors channelled
their investment in China through an entity in a tax haven jurisdiction. For a
discussion of these tax incentives, see Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax
Incentives, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 670 (2007).
27 [19841 1 S.C.R. 536.
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the situation in that case, the Court reasoned that it should not assume the
power to disregard genuine legal arrangements simply because of their tax
avoidance motivation. The lesson that the Department of Finance drew from
the reasoning in Stubart was that the Income Tax Act ought to include a
general anti- avoidance rule, which would cover such a broad range of
tax avoidance activity that an unforeseen device such as that employed in
Stubart would not fall through the cracks again.
China's motivations for enacting the GAAR were different from Canada's.
One possible motivation was to empower the SAT to combat cross-border tax
planning. As mentioned earlier, tax avoidance has been closely associated
in China with foreign investors, especially multinational corporations.
Although the Enterprise Income Tax Law and Regulations include some
well-known specific anti-avoidance rules, such as transfer pricing, thin
capitalization, controlled foreign corporations and anti-tax-haven rules, the
drafters were concerned with the types of avoidance transactions that
can circumvent the application of these rules. China's tax base, hence
its national interest, would be harmed by such transactions. According to
the SAT's published materials, the main purpose of the GAAR is to combat
"hidden" or "unforeseeable" tax avoidance transactions by supplementing
the application of specific anti-avoidance rules. "No matter how airtight the
tax law system is, loopholes always exist.",2 The main target of the GAAR
seems to be cross-border transactions. The perception is that multinational
companies are engaged in aggressive tax planning to avoid Chinese taxes.
Another possible motivation for the Chinese GAAR is "scientific" drafting
so that the law on paper looks comprehensive. The GAAR provision is
located in Chapter Six of the Enterprise Income Tax Law. There is a sense
that the inclusion of the GAAR in Chapter Six helps complete China's
anti-avoidance legislation on paper, enhancing the scientific value of the
legislation.
28 Explanations of the Enterprise Income Tax Regulations are available at State
Administration of Taxation, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n480934/
index.html (last visited July 26, 2009).
29 Xin qi ye suo de shui fa jing shen xuan chuan ti gang [Guidelines for Public
Education of the Spirit of the New Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by
the SAT, No. 159, Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/
n480513/n480934/index.html.
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C. Application of the GAAR
The application of the GAAR in Canada and China differs in terms of who
has the power of giving meaning and effect to the GAAR. As a result, the
scope of the Canadian GAAR may be much narrower in action than on
paper. The opposite is likely true in China.
In Canada, application of the GAAR involves the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA) and the courts. The effectiveness of the GAAR depends on
its judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court of Canada has been reluctant
to hear GAAR cases. Because the court's jurisdiction is discretionary (it
grants leave to appeal), it refused to hear GAAR cases until 2005, seventeen
years after the GAAR was enacted. The GAAR decisions by the Tax Court
of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal have largely been in favor of
taxpayers."o In the three GAAR decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada,
there was a clear win for the government in Mathew, a clear win for the
taxpayer in Canada TrustCo, and a split decision with a 4/3 majority in
favor of the government in Lipson.
The Lipson case is the most telling in regard to the effectiveness of the
GAAR. Two dissenting justices were strongly in favor of the continuing
validity of the Duke of Westminster principle1 and vigorously defended
legitimate tax planning from unpredictable application ofthe GAAR. Another
dissenting justice would have applied a specific anti-avoidance rule instead
of the GAAR. The slight majority advocated a purposive reading of the law
and was concerned that the minority's approach would "essentially gut" the
GAAR. The majority reiterated that:
The GAAR is neither a penal provision nor a hammer to pound
taxpayers into submission. It is designed, in the complex context of
the ITA, to restrain abusive tax avoidance and to make sure that the
fairness of the tax system is preserved. A desire to avoid uncertainty
cannot justify ignoring a provision of the ITA that is clearly intended
to apply to transactions that would otherwise be valid on their face. 32
The Supreme Court of Canada's reluctance to hear GAAR cases and its
"restrained" approach to interpreting the GAAR may be attributable to the
facts that: (a) the GAAR was enacted to overrule the Court's decision in the
30 For an overview of the GAAR jurisprudence, see INNES ET AL., supra note 22, at
80-89.
31 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
32 Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 52.
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Stubart case and limits a long-standing common law principle based on the
Duke of Westminster case, that is, taxpayers are entitled to tax minimization;
(b) the GAAR requires the Court to adopt a purposive interpretation of tax
statutes that the Court was not accustomed to; and (c) the level of uncertainty
associated with applying this type of rules.
The Chinese GAAR begins and ends with the SAT under the
current system. It does not depend on the court for interpretation and
implementation. On the other hand, the implementation ofthe GAAR depends
on the effectiveness of local offices in identifying tax avoidance transactions
and submitting the case to the head-office. It is beyond the scope ofthis Article
to detail the challenges facing the SAT in managing corruption, inefficiencies,
and resources. Suffice it to say that these challenges are internal to the SAT
and it is within the powers of the SAT to give effect to the GAAR.
The concept of "abusive avoidance" is much narrower in Canada. On
the basis of Lipson and Mathew, the only type of abusive transactions are
those "anti-avoidance karate" schemes in which taxpayers attempt to use a
statutory anti-avoidance provision to their advantage.34 In the Mathew case,
the taxpayers attempted to take advantage of the "stop-loss" rule (that is, a
rule designed to prevent taxpayers from generating paper losses to reduce
taxable income) to acquire the loss of another taxpayer. As the Supreme
Court of Canada stated:
Section 18(13) [of the Income Tax Act] preserves and transfers a loss
under the assumption that it will be realized by a taxpayer who does
33 The SAT's head-office is in Beijing and there are local bureaus across the country.
The head-office of the SAT does not process tax returns or directly deal with
taxpayers. Its role is mainly limited to setting policies, providing guidance to local
offices, and functioning as a competent tax authority for China under bilateral tax
treaties. The head-office is involved in selected cases related to transfer pricing, such
as negotiating advance pricing agreements, large tax evasion or avoidance cases,
or administrative review. Local offices of the SAT are established at the provincial,
municipal and township levels. They deal with taxpayers, process tax returns, and
enforce tax collections. There are also local tax bureaus responsible for collecting
"local" taxes and taxes shared between the national and local government. Local tax
bureaus are part of local government in terms of appointment and compensation,
but under the SAT in terms of tax policy. Uniform implementation of national law
across China is a challenge because of close personal, economic and social links of
local tax officials with taxpayers and local government. The SAT issues circulars,
rulings and other types of guidelines to improve the quality of tax administration at
the local level.
34 Robert Walker, Ramsay 25 Years On: Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance, 120 LAW
Q. REV. 412, 422 (2004).
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not deal at arm's length with the transferor.... To use these provisions
to preserve and sell an unrealized loss to an arm's length party results
in abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4).35
Similarly, in Lipson, the taxpayers turned an anti-income splitting rule under
subsection 74.1(1) on its head and used it as part of a scheme to obtain
interest deductions between the spouses. Bowman C.J.T.C. remarked: "The
purpose of section 74.1 is to prevent income splitting.... Here the attribution
rules are being used in essence to allow the attributed dividend income to
carry back with it to [the transferor] the interest deduction [to cloak a non-
deductible interest expense with an income-earning purpose]."36
If the courts were not involved in interpreting the GAAR in Canada, the
actual scope of application of the Canadian GAAR would be closer to that of
the Chinese GAAR. This could be seen from treaty-shopping transactions.
In the Canadian MIL Investments case, the government considered treaty
shopping abusive under the GAAR, but the court ruled against it. In China,
the SAT considers treaty shopping to be subject to the GAAR. In a circular
published by the local bureau of the SAT, a holding company used by a
company resident in Singapore for investment in a Chinese company was
looked through or ignored by the tax administration in determining the source
of the gains from the disposition of the shares in the holding company.
The gain was deemed to be realized from the sale of equity interest in the
Chinese company, and to arise from a source in China for the purpose of
Chinese domestic law and the China-Singapore tax treaty." Similarly, the
formal residence of a holding company in Barbados was ignored by the
Chinese authorities where the shareholders and directors of this company
were individuals resident in the United States.39
35 Mathew v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 643, para. 58.
36 Lipson v. The Queen, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 2494, para. 22. (Can. Tax. Ct.).
37 MIL (Investments) S.A. v. The Queen, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 2552 (Can. Tax Ct.), aff'd,
[2007] F.C. 236 (Fed. Ct. App.).
38 This is a ruling published on November 27, 2008 on the website
of the Yuzhong District State Taxation Bureau of Chongqing City. See
www.cqsw.gov.cn/jcsx/20081127111.htm (last visited July 26, 2009). For a brief
discussion of this case, see Houlu Yang, supra note 7.
39 This is referred to as the "Xinjiang Anti-Treaty Shopping" circular. See Houlu Yang,
supra note 7. It was published by the SAT as Guo Shui Han (Notice) [2008] No.
1076 which was issued on December 30, 2008.
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D. Nature and Effect of the GAAR
Is the GAAR intended to be a guide for distinguishing between acceptable
and unacceptable tax avoidance or to be a "hammer"? If it is the former, the
GAAR can function as a statutory interpretation principle that requires tax
provisions be given a meaning that is consistent with the legislative context,
purpose and intent. That is more or less the case in Canada. The Canadian
GAAR has the potential of shifting the judicial approach to tax avoidance
because Canadian courts have generally favoured a more literal, formalistic
approach to statutory interpretation as opposed to purposive, substantive
approach.
When the GAAR was enacted in Canada, the accompanying
Explanatory Notes issued by the government stated that the GAAR "is
intended to prevent abusive tax avoidance transactions or arrangements
but at the same time is not intended to interfere with legitimate
commercial and family transactions," and that the GAAR "seeks to
distinguish between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance
and to establish a reasonable balance between the protection of the tax
base and the need for certainty for taxpayers in planning their affairs."40
The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in the Canada Trustco case that
"the GAAR draws a line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive
tax avoidance."4 In its most recent GAAR decision in Lipson, the majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that "[t]he GAAR is neither
a penal provision nor a hammer to pound taxpayers into submission.
It is designed, in the complex context of the ITA, to restrain abusive
tax avoidance and to make sure that the fairness of the tax system is
preserved."42 Some Tax Court judges had previously described the GAAR
as an "extreme sanction,"4 an "ultimate weapon,"44 a "heavy hammer,"45 or
a "blunt instrument"46 that can be used only as a measure of last resort.
40 MICHAEL H. WILSON, MINISTER OF FINANCE, EXPLANATORY NOTES TO LEGISLATION
RELATING TO INCOME TAx 461 (1988).
41 Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, para. 16.
42 Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 52.
43 Jabs Construction Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 C.T.C. 2556, para. 48 (Can. Tax.
Ct.).
44 Hill v. The Queen, [2003] 4 C.T.C. 2548, para. 63 (Can. Tax. Ct.).
45 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. The Queen, [2003] 4 C.T.C. 2009, para. 58 (Can.
Tax. Ct.).
46 CIT Financial Ltd. v. The Queen, [2004] 1 C.T.C. 2232, para. 30 (Can. Tax
Ct.).
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In China, the GAAR has not been rationalized as a means of balancing
the protection of the tax base and taxpayers' right to tax planning. It is
clearly an instrument to be used at the discretion of the SAT. On the other
hand, enacting the GAAR may have the effect of signaling that "general tax
avoidance" is tolerable as long as it does not offend the GAAR. In effect,
the line-drawing function in China seems to work in the opposite direction
as that in Canada, namely, the Chinese GAAR "officially" recognizes "tax
avoidance" as acceptable, whereas the Canadian GAAR attempts to signal
out "abusive avoidance" as unacceptable.
III. INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS
In the previous Parts of this Article, I have demonstrated that the GAAR
in Canada and China may be similar on paper, but different in action. In
this Part I shall attempt to explain this phenomenon by looking at some
institutional and cultural contexts.
A. General Legal System
The application of a tax rule, including the GAAR, is dependent on the
general legal environment in which tax laws are made and interpreted.
There are some fundamental differences between the general legal systems
in Canada and China that affect how the GAAR operates in reality.
The Canadian system is based on the principle of the rule of law.
The principle signifies that "all elements of Canadian society - public and
private, individual and institutional - are subject to and governed by known
legal rules."47 In atax context, the rule of law means that taxes must be imposed
through a proper parliamentary process rather than through administrative or
judicial discretion. The government as well as the taxpayers must comply
with tax laws. The rule of law also implies that tax laws must be reasonably
capable of discovery and that taxpayers should be able to reasonably predict, in
advance and with a sufficient degree of certainty, the tax consequences oftheir
actions. It also implies the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary. The legislature and thejudiciary both participate in the development
of the GAAR.
The Chinese legal system is not based on the Canadian notion of rule of
47 Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, Foreword to GERALD L. GALL, THE
CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, at ii (5th ed. 2004).
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law. China is a "socialist country ruled by law" (shehui zhuyifazhi guojia)48
and had a long history of "rule by man" in imperial China.49 The preamble to
the Constitution states that China will be guided by "Marxism-Leninism, Mao
Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory" and that "the Chinese people of all
ethnic groups will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship
and the socialist road." There is no separation of powers. The Constitution
provides that the State Council and the People's Courts both be subordinate to
the National People's Congress (the formal lawmaking body). Globalization
and China's access to the World Trade Organization have brought about
significant law reforms in China, especially in respect of making the laws
more accessible to the public. However, the fundamental structure of the legal
system remains the same.
B. Institutions and Process of Tax Lawmaking
In Canada, several government institutions are involved in tax law, namely
Parliament enacts tax legislation, the judiciary interprets tax law and fills
the gaps in tax legislation, the Canada Revenue Agency administers tax
law, and the Department of Justice represents the government in tax cases
before the courts. The Department of Finance is generally responsible for
tax policy and introducing draft tax legislation. There is a dynamic process
which begins with the introduction of a tax law or rule that taxpayers
subsequently apply in a manner that minimizes their tax liability, which often
involves exploiting "loopholes"; the Canada Revenue Agency challenges
the taxpayer's interpretation and reassesses the taxpayer's tax liability; the
taxpayer disputes the assessment and brings a lawsuit to the court; the
judge interprets the law, often in favor of the taxpayer; Parliament does not
agree with the court's decision and enacts new rules to plug the loopholes;
and another round begins. Such a dynamic legislative process involving
multiple institutions produces highly technical, complex tax legislation,
although it does strive to balance the interest of taxpayers and that of the
government. The Canadian Income Tax Act" grew from 20 pages (large
48 In 1999 the Constitution was amended to state in article 5: "The People's Republic
of China shall practice ruling the country according to law, and shall construct a
socialist rule-of-law state."
49 DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 39-66
(2003); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: A THREAT TO THE WEST OR
MODEL FOR THE REST? (2007); PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE (2001).
50 Income Tax Act, 1970-71-72 S.C., ch. 63 (1971) (Can.) enacted the substance of
the Act, although it did not wholly repeal the previous Act. The first federal income
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print) in 1917 to 1500 pages (in small print and on 2-column pages) in 2007."
It currently weighs more than a kilogram! 52 The monumental statute is very
detailed, complex, and drafted in precise, technical and sometimes formulaic
language.5 3
The judiciary plays a pivotal role in the development of Canadian tax
law. Through adjudicating cases, the courts interpret the meaning of tax
provisions and their interpretation becomes "law" unless it is overruled by
legislative amendments. The judicial approach to statutory interpretation is
in part responsible for the increasing complexity of the Income Tax Act,
including the enactment of the GAAR.54 Under strict, literal interpretation,
taxpayers are entitled to benefit from any ambiguity in the legislation or
unintentional glitches in the law that they (or their tax advisors) find by
applying a literal reading of the law until the ambiguity or glitches are
addressed through legislation. New provisions of the Income Tax Act are
drafted to make them as detailed and airtight as possible. Inexorably the
tax was introduced in 1917. It was supposed to be a temporary wartime measure to
raise revenue to finance Canada's war effort. But as the income tax was proven to
be a reliable source of government revenue, the temporary tax became permanent
after the war: in 1948, the word "War" was dropped. The current Income Tax Act
(ITA) was enacted in 1971 and came into force at the beginning of 1972.
51 E.g., THE PRACTITIONER'S INCOME TAX ACT (David M. Sherman ed., 31st ed. 2007).
When supporting regulations are added, the legislation comprises some 2500 pages.
52 lpsco Inc. v. The Queen, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 2907, para. 26 (Can. Tax. Ct.).
53 There are many specific anti-avoidance rules, designed to stop various types of
avoidance transaction. There are also many cross-references and related provisions
that add further complexity. The Income Tax Act is intended to apply to more than
three quarters of the general population, many of whom are willing to exploit any
linguistic imprecision to their benefit. The drafters of the Act attempt to use precise
language in order to minimize loopholes. Many of the provisions in the Act are
limitations or restrictions involving two or more variables. Some provisions are
very lengthy. For example, section 95(2) (which deems income from the specified
activities as either falling within the foreign accrual property income regime or
falling outside it) has over 6000 words, and comprises more than seven pages.
54 The textual, contextual and purposive approach to interpreting the ITA was
established by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Canada Trustco (SCC) decision.
However, the particularity and detail of many tax provisions have often led
to an emphasis on textual interpretation. Where Parliament has specified
precisely what conditions must be satisfied to achieve a particular result, it is
reasonable to assume that Parliament intended that taxpayers would rely on
such provisions to achieve the result they prescribe.
Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, para. 11. The Court
remains uncertain about the relative weight of context and purpose in statutory
interpretation.
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Income Tax Act can only become longer and more complicated, as Parliament
must overturn decision after decision by statutory amendment. As the Income
Tax Act becomes more detailed and complex, it breeds more aggressive tax
planning and leaves less room for "liberal" interpretation, causing yet more
amendments. The cycle perpetuates itself. Even after the enactment of the
GAAR and the recent shift towards contextual and purposive interpretation,
the Supreme Court of Canada maintained that the text of the Income Tax Act
must be given "greater emphasis" in the interpretation because of the degree of
precision and detail characteristic of many tax provisions. The Court further
stated that clear, precise, and unequivocal wording plays a dominant role
because taxpayers are entitled to certainty in planning their affairs."
In China, there are two government institutions involved in tax lawmaking:
the National People's Congress and the State Council/SAT. The process of
generating tax law reforms does not involve the judiciary. The notion of "tax
law" in China is much broader than in Canada because rules and measures
introduced by the SAT or Ministry of Finance have the force of law.5 6 On the
other hand, court decisions do not form part of Chinese tax law, although they
can be an important source of reference for taxpayers. There are three different
layers of "tax law" in China: (a) legislation entitled "law" promulgated by the
legislature -the National People's Congress- containing general principles
and basic rules;" (b) implementation regulations introduced by the State
55 Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Finance), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 715,
para. 21.
56 For example, the Enterprise Income Tax Law was enacted by the National People's
Congress, the Enterprise Income Tax Regulations were enacted by the State Council,
and the Special Measures were issued by the SAT. The level of detail increases
when the lawmaking body's ranking decreases under the Chinese Constitution.
The higher-order legislation is generally broadly worded, leaving ample space for
the executive legislation to expand. This is consistent with China's history and
bureaucratic tradition - laws begin and end with the bureaucracy. The enactment
of the GAAR is just one example of this. It is up to the SAT to assess whether a
taxpayer's transaction violates the GAAR, and its assessment is final.
57 There is a long tradition of this style of lawmaking in China. See William Alford,
The Limits of "Grand Theory" in Comparative Lav, 61 WASH. L. REV. 945 (1985);
THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MIXED
COURT, 1911-27 (1992); William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current
Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 7 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003); Graham Mayeda, A
Normative Perspective on Legal Harmonization: China 's Accession to the WTO,
38 U.B.C. L. REV. 83 (2005); XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE
TRADITION (1997).
58 The National People's Congress (NPC) is the supreme body under the Chinese
Constitution. It meets once a year in Beijing. Most of the laws are passed by the
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Council, which spell out more details for the implementation of the provisions
in the law;59 and (c) rules and regulations issued by the SAT. For example, the
basic GAAR provision is found in Article 47 of the Enterprise Income Tax
Law. 60 The Enterprise Income Tax Regulations define the meaning of a key
concept - "business arrangements without bona fide commercial purpose"
- in Article 121 and impose tax penalties in Article 122. The Anti-Avoidance
Rules provide technical details."
Chinese tax laws are drafted in general language, containing general
principles as well as "open-ended provisions," leaving much room for
administrative discretion. Coupled with the lack of independent judicial
interpretation, the system is generally more "opaque" than its Canadian
counterpart.
The fundamental differences between the general legal system and
institutions in Canada and China can be seen in the role of the tax
administration. The Canada Revenue Agency's role is to administer tax
law. At court, the Canada Revenue Agency and the taxpayer have equal
status, each represented by counsel. The Chinese SAT, by contrast, has
lawmaking powers.6 2 The SAT enjoys another power that is not available to
Standing Committee of the NPC. The NPC often delegates legislative powers to the
government (i.e., the State Council or ministries of the State Council). In practice,
the Communist Party controls the lawmaking process, as most members of the NPC
are Communist Party members who are required to follow the Party direction. See
CHOW, supra note 49.
59 The State Council is the most powerful organ of state in China. It has the power to
administer and enforce the legislation enacted by the NPC or the NPC's Standing
Committee. It is also a legitimate lawmaking body on its own. Chinese Law-M/faking
Law recognizes the force of law of "administrative regulations" by the State Council,
as well as administrative rules introduced by a ministry of State Council, such as the
Ministry of Finance or SAT. More importantly, because Chinese legislation is drafted
in broad language and provides broad discretionary powers to the administration,
the government can often extend or modify the law in practice.
60 Prior to 2008, enterprises with foreign investment and domestic enterprises were
subject to different systems of taxation. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to review the history of the Chinese enterprise income tax system. For more
discussion, see DONALD. J.S. BREAN, TAXATION IN MODERN CHINA (1998); JINYAN
Li, TAXATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1999); Jinyan Li & He Huang,
The Transformation of Chinese Enterprise Income Tax: Internationalization and
Chinese Innovations, 62 BULL. INT'L TAX'N 275 (2008); and Jinyan Li, Fundamental
Enterprise Income Tax Reform in China: Motivations and Major Changes, 61 BULL.
INT'L TAX'N 519 (2007).
61 See Te bie na shui tiao zheng shi shi ban fa [Measures for the Implementation of
the Special Tax Adjustment (trial)] (promulgated by the State Administration of
Taxation, Jan. 10, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2009).
62 Article 89 of the Chinese Constitution provides that the State Council has the
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the Canada Revenue Agency - statutory interpretation. Under Chinese law,
the body that has the power to make law also has the power to interpret the
law. As such, the SAT has the sole authority to interpret its own regulations
and the regulations enacted by the State Council. While the National People's
Congress, or its Standing Committee, has the power to interpret tax laws, such
as the Enterprise Income Tax Law, it has not published any interpretations
of tax laws. In practice, the SAT's interpretation is binding. By contrast, the
guidelines or interpretation circulars issued by the Canada Revenue Agency
constitute an extensive and valuable commentary on the law,63 but do not
have the force of law. The courts regard them merely as "interpretive aids." 64
Therefore, faced with unacceptable tax avoidance transactions, the Canada
Revenue Agency's only recourse is to either litigate in court or persuade
Parliament to amend the tax legislation.
C. Judicial Attitude Towards Tax Avoidance
It is perhaps unfair to compare the different judicial attitudes towards tax
avoidance because the Chinese judiciary does not play much of a role in
developing tax law. Nonetheless, the lack ofjudicial influence in China is an
important context for understanding the divergence of the GAAR in action.
The origin of the Canadian judicial approach towards tax avoidance dates
back to the British House of Lords' decision in the Duke of Westminster
(1935) case.65 This case established a principle that a taxpayer is entitled
power "to adopt administrative measures, enact administrative rules and regulations
and issue decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution and the law."
Article 90 of the Constitution provides that the ministries and commissions of the
State Council have the power to "issue orders, directives and regulations within
the jurisdiction of their respective departments and in accordance with the law and
the administrative rules and regulations, decisions and orders issued by the State
Council." The directives, regulations and measures issued by the SAT have the force
of law, as long as they do not violate the legislation enacted by the State Council
and the National People's Congress. See Li fa fa [Chinese Law-Making Law] art. 71
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective
July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 112 (P.R.C.).
63 These publications are available on the Canada Revenue Agency's
website. Canada Revenue Agency, Forms and Publications, http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/formspubs/menu-e.html (last visited July 26, 2009).
64 See, e.g., Nowegijick v. The Queen., [1983] C.T.C. 20, 24 (Can. Tax Ct.).
65 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1
(H.L.). For a comparison of this case with the American case, Helvering v. Gregory,
see Assaf Likovski, The Duke and the Lay: Helvering v. Gregory and the History
of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953 (2003-04).
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to arrange his affairs to minimize tax. This principle is derived from the
strict or literal approach to statutory interpretation and the characterization
of transactions based on legal form.66 Literal interpretation and taxation
on the basis of legal form created a potent combination that allowed tax
avoidance transactions to flourish. The facts in Duke of Westminster were
straightforward. The Duke of Westminster had a number of household
servants. The then British Income Tax Act did not allow a deduction of
wages of household servants, but allowed a deduction of annual payments
made in pursuance of a legal obligation other than remuneration of servants.
The Duke accordingly entered into deeds of covenant with each of his
servants under which he undertook to pay each of them annual sums for
a period of seven years. The payments were to be made irrespective of
whether any services were performed by the promisee, and were without
prejudice to the promisee's entitlement to remuneration if he or she did
perform any services to the promisor. However, it was established by
evidence that the understanding between the Duke and his servants was
that they would rest content with the provision made for them by deed,
and would not assert any right to remuneration. In this way, the Duke
converted his non-deductible wages obligation into a deductible annuity
obligation. The deeds were legally effective in that all legal formalities had
been carried out. Nor were the deeds shams: the Duke had covenanted to pay
the annuities for seven years, and had thereby assumed the risk of having to
continue to pay an annuitant who had stopped working for him or who had
insisted upon additional remuneration for working for him. Of course, the
understanding that the faithful retainers would continue to work for him,
and would do so without extra charge, virtually eliminated this risk. But the
risk was genuinely assumed, and none of their lordships regarded the deeds
as shams. The legal form of the transactions was found controlling and the
Duke was entitled to deduct the payments.
The Duke of Westminster principle is deeply entrenched in Canadian tax
law - so deeply that the principle is applied by the courts without any
analysis of the origin of the principle or its continuing validity or viability.
The courts have not developed any meaningful general anti-avoidance
66 According to strict interpretation, tax could only be imposed if a taxpayer's situation
was literally covered by the words of a charging provision; and a taxpayer's
situation was determined by reference to the legal rights and obligations created by
the taxpayer, not the economic substance. If, therefore, a taxpayer arranged the legal
rights and obligations so that the statute did not literally apply, tax was avoided
despite the fact that the arrangement, especially if construed in accordance with its
economic substance, might have been within the spirit of the statute.
67 The Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed the Duke of Westminster principle
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principle to deal with abusive avoidance transactions. As mentioned already,
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Stubart v. The Queen" was the
immediate reason for the introduction of the GAAR. The enactment of the
GAAR was intended to instruct the judiciary to consider the object and
spirit of the legislation. As discussed above, however, the courts have been
reluctant in abandoning the traditional mindset.
Chinese courts do not have the final power of statutory interpretation.
They generally hear administrative cases involving taxpayers suing tax
officials for "misconducts." 69 These cases are generally concerned with
actions in assessing penalties, enforcing collections, or other aspects of
tax administration? Disputes between taxpayers and the tax administration
arising from the interpretation of tax legislation are mostly resolved through
administrative reviews." The GAAR is thus not an instruction to the courts
about interpreting tax law in a manner that prevents abusive tax avoidance.
The GAAR is written for taxpayers and tax administrators. That is why similar
treaty shopping cases are considered offensive by tax administration in both
China and Canada, but the GAAR eventually applied only in China because
the Canadian courts disagreed with the Canada Revenue Agency.
many times, especially in a series of cases in the late 1990s involving aggressive
avoidance schemes. Eg, Shell Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622.
68 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536.
69 Xing zheng su song fa [The Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic
of China] (promulgated at the 2nd Session of the 7th National People's Congress,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990.) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited July 26, 2009)
(P.R.C.) The SAT has issued guidelines to help local tax offices prepare for the
defense, make arguments in court, file appeals, and enforce court decisions. See Shui
wu xing zheng ying su gong zuo gui chen [Operational Guidelines on Responding
to Tax Administrative Appeals] (effective Jan. 1, 1995), available at http://www.
chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n480934/index.html; see also Decision of the
SAT on Several Questions Concerning Establishing Disciplinary and Inspection
Offices, ZHONGGUO SHI-iwu BAO [CHINA TAX NEWSPAPER], Nov. 15, 1995.
70 In such administrative cases, taxpayers have won more than two-thirds of the
cases. See SONG SHUWEN, MA XIA & KONG BING, CASE COMMENTS ON LITIGATION
BETWEEN CITIZENS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 146-52 (1992).
71 YAO MEIYAN & HAO RuYu, STUDY ON CHINESE TAXATION LEGAL SYSTEMS 663-69
(2005). Judicial appeals on matters of interpretation are virtually nonexistent in
China. Id. at 257. Tax expertise is concentrated in the tax administration. Tax
officials are presumed to know tax laws better than anyone else (taxpayers, judges,
and members of the legislature). The small number of tax cases makes it difficult
for judges to develop tax expertise. There is a lack of institutional competence on
the part of the judiciary to deal with tax law interpretation.
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D. Right to Tax Minimization
Tax minimization generally takes the form of tax avoidance in Canada and,
until recently, tax evasion in China. While tax avoidance is a form of "open
confrontation" between taxpayers and the tax administration and the rules of
engagement are interpreted by the judges, tax evasion is deceitful and often
associated with other illegal activities. The line between tax avoidance and
tax evasion is generally clear in Canada and often not so clear in China.
In Canada, the principle that taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs
in such a manner as to minimize tax liability is deeply entrenched in tax law.
This is generally attributed to the Duke of Westminster case. Lord Tomlin's
remarks in the Duke of Westminster case remain current:
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax
attaching under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would
be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to
pay an increased tax.72
The same attitude continues under the GAAR because the GAAR is
intended to limit, not eliminate, taxpayers' right to tax minimization .7' The
Supreme Court of Canada stated clearly in the Lipson case that "the Duke of
Westminster principle has never been absolute, and Parliament enacted ...
the GAAR, to limit the scope of allowable avoidance transactions while
maintaining certainty for taxpayers".74 Therefore, in Canada, taxpayers do not
hide the fact that they are engaged in tax minimization and there is certainly
nothing to be ashamed of.
Until recently, "tax avoidance" or lawful minimization of taxation did not
exist in the Chinese vocabulary.7 There is a gap between the "official" attitude
72 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. The Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1, 7
(H.L.) (Lord Tomlin).
73 Canada TrustCo Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, para.13.
74 Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 54.
75 Zhang Jingqun, Tou shui wen ti tan yuan [The Origin of Tax Evasion], 7 TAX'N RES.
70 (2000); Zheng Junsheng, Qian tan shui shou liu shi de chengyinji zhi li [On the
Cause and Abatement of Revenue Loss], 2 TAX'N RES. 17 (1999); Zhang Yunping,
Tou tao shui cheng yin de fen xi ji qi zhi li [On the Cause and Abatement of Tax
Evasion], 1 TAX'N RES. 58 (1997); Dong Lei, Wo guo dang qian tou tao shui chan
sheng de you yinji dui ce [The Cause and Strategies of Tax Evasion], 4 TAX'N RES.
67 (2001); Zhang Yi, Tou tao shui yuan yin pou xi [On the Cause of Tax Evasion],
9 TAX'N RES. 48 (2000); Li Jiansuo, Qian tan shui shou liu shi de qu dao ji fang
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and the "popular" attitude. The official propaganda is that tax payment is an
honorable duty and noncompliance is shameful. 6 The purpose of taxation is
to raise revenue from the people in order to better serve the people (que zhi
yu min, yong zhi yu min). The SAT publishes an annual list of "model
taxpayers." This line of propaganda is consistent with the "socialist" ideal
and traditional Chinese values emphasizing the collective interest. It does not
distinguish between non-payment of tax by way of "evasion" or "avoidance."
Therefore, the notion of a taxpayer's right to minimize taxation is not
officially recognized in China. In reality, Chinese taxpayers are not much
different from their Canadian counterparts in desiring to pay the minimal
amount of tax possible. Tax minimization was achieved primarily through tax
evasion or gaining favorable tax treatment through favorable administrative
interpretation of the law. Tax minimization through tax planning is a recent
phenomenon, transplanted to China by foreign investors. The concept of
"tax avoidance" itself can be considered a "transplant" that came to China
with foreign direct investment. The SAT seems to have shown a great deal of
deference towards international tax norms, including taxpayers' right to tax
planning.7 The introduction of the GAAR may be perceived as the beginning
of an official recognition of tax avoidance.
The "right" to tax minimization in Canada is thus clearly contrasted to the
"duty to pay tax" in China. This contrast reflects the different nature of the
relationship between the government and taxpayers. In Canada and other
Western countries, the right to tax avoidance is arguably rooted in a core
individual right, including the right to choose the form of the transaction,
and the right to assume that tax statutes must be certainly defined in scope
and subject to strict or literal interpretation. The ideological basis of the
right to tax avoidance is the right of liberty, which can be understood as
the liberty of the subject to be free from an overreaching government, the
freedom of property, and the freedom to contract.7 There is no equivalent
ideology in China. The duty to pay taxes is based on the traditional values
fan cuo shi [On the Channel of Revenue Loss and Precautions], 6 TAX'N RES. 40
(1999).
76 See SAT Home Page, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/index.html (last visited
July 26, 2009).
77 Other than transfer pricing cases, the SAT does not seem to have been very aggressive
in assessing avoidance transactions. Possible explanations for this approach may
include the lack of specific legislative authorization, as the appearance of "taxation
in accordance with law" is considered important when it comes to dealing with
foreign investors.
78 William B. Barker, The Ideology of Tax Avoidance, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 229 (2009).
For further discussion. see Louis EISENSTEIN. THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).
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emphasizing collective right and social harmony.79 The relationship between
the government and taxpayers is framed in terms of a "duty" to support the
state, as opposed to a kind of"deprivation" of private property.so Taxpayers are
not regarded as equals in such a relationship. In traditional China, the payment
of taxes to the emperor was analogized to supporting one's parent because the
emperor was the "head" of the nation-family." The taxpayer/children's duty
to support the emperor/parent was "unconditional" and a moral obligation.82
Resorting to aggressive tax planning to minimize taxation may be perceived
as playing games or defying the authority of tax law and tax authorities, which
is generally frowned upon.
Interestingly, some Chinese scholars attribute the low level of tax
compliance (not by way of tax planning) to the lack of recognition of
taxpayers' rights." Recognizing the taxpayers right to tax minimization has
been recently touted as an important step towards the development of the rule
79 In China, rights are more commonly associated with collectivities and claims made in
the name of community membership rather than negative freedoms vis-d-vis the state.
See WANG GUNGWU, THE CHINESENESS OF CHINA (1991); RANDLE R. EDWARDS,
Louis HENKIN & ANDREW J. NATHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
(1986); XIN REN, supra note 57, at 19-35; Jones, supra note 57, at 7-45.
80 Fang Jing, Zhongxi fang shuishoufalu wenhua bUiao yanjiu [A Comparative Study
on Chinese and Western Tax Cultures], 16 J. YANTAI U. [PHIL. & Soc. SC.] 43
(2003); Li Linping, Zhong xi fang shui shou wen hua zhi bUiao [Comparison of
Chinese and Western Tax Cultures], 8 Li LUN DAOKAN [J. ON THEORY] 77 (2005);
Liu Rong & Du Jian, Na shui ren quan li bao hu yu wo guo shui shou si fa gai
ge [The Protection of Taxpayers' Rights and Chinese Taxation Judicial Reform],
1 TAX'N RES. 51 (2007); You Xiaofeng & Wang Zhifang, Shui shou qi yue yu na
shui ren quan Ii zhi bao hu [Taxation Agreement and the Protection of Taxpayers'
Rights], 2 TAX'N RES. 69 (2008).
81 Fang Jing, supra note 80; Li Linping, supra note 80, at 77-78; Yang Bin, Zhong xi
fang wen hua chaiyi yu shui zhi gai ge [Differences Between Chinese and Western
Cultures and Tax Reform - A Case Study of VAT and Personal Income Tax], 5
SHUI Wu YAN Jiu [TAX RES.] 14 (2005); Yu Daqing & Peng Jiming, Zhong ying
chuantong shuishou wenhua bUiao [Comparison Between Chinese and English
Traditional Tax Cultures] 16 J. XIA'N INST. FIN. & ECON. 13 (2003).
82 Li Qian & Han Yu, <Qi ye suo de shui fa>yi ban fan bi shui tiao kuan ping xi
[Some Comments on General Anti-Avoidance Provisions in the Enterprise Income
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China], 8 INT'L TAX'N CHINA 68 (2008); Zhou
Chengjuan, Lun shuifa de he xin jia zhi yu na shui ren de quan Ii bao hu [On the
Core Values of Tax Law and the Protection of Taxpayers' Rights], 4 TAX'N RES. 60
(2009); Wang Jianping, Na shui ren quan Ii Ii nian yu zheng fu - na shui ren guan
xi de zhuan xing [The Concept of Taxpayers' Right and the Relationship Between
the Government and Taxpayers], 4 INT'L TAX'N CHINA 57 (2008).
83 See, e.g., Cai Jun & Cui Hao, Gou jian he xie zheng na guan xi de Ii yi ji chu yu
shui zhi lujing [Basis and Ways ofDeveloping a Harmonious Relationship Between
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of law in the Chinese tax system, as it would demand that tax laws be certain
and predictable and that the courts independently adjudicate tax cases.84
E. Tax Culture
The divergence between the GAAR in action in Canada and China can
be attributed to the significant differences in the tax culture of the two
countries. First, the Canadian GAAR is home-grown, enacted to deal with a
problem that is rooted in the Canadian tax culture. Tax avoidance came into
existence with the introduction of income tax in 1917. In China, the first
income tax was introduced 1980 and applicable only, in effect, to foreign
investors and foreign individuals in China. A uniform individual income tax
applicable to Chinese and foreign individuals was introduced in 1993 and a
uniform enterprise income tax law was introduced only in 2008. The income
tax system in China is the product of globalization and transplantation. It
is relatively easy to transplant tax laws, but much harder to transplant the
values and principles underlying the modern tax laws, such as the rule of
law, respect of private property, the ideology of liberty, and the nature of
relationship between taxpayers and the state. While it takes time for the
transplanted system to take effect, there is likely a gap between the law on
paper (which has been transplanted from the West) and the law in action
(which is defined by local conditions).
The widespread existence of tax avoidance in Canada is generally
attributable to various factors, including: (a) the charging provisions of
tax statutes are drafted in clear language that provides a reasonable level of
Tax Authorities and Taxpayers], 2 TAX'N RES. 74 (2008); Liu Rong, Cong shui shou
fa lv zhi du de shi jiao kan zheng fit yu na shui ren de guan xi [On the Mutual
Relationship Between the Government and the Taxpayers from a Perspective of Tax
Law System], 4 TAX'N RES. 56 (2009); Ruan Jiafu, Lun wo guo shui shou wen hua
de xian zhuang yu jian she si lu [On the Status Quo of Chinese Tax Culture and the
Idea of Construction], 11 TAX'N RES. 92 (2008); Wang Wei, Na shui ren quan li yu
wo guo shui shou zun cong du de ti sheng [On Safe Guarding the Right of Taxpayers
to Promote Tax Compliance in China], 4 TAX'N RES. 70 (2008).
84 See Luan Guohua, Na shui ren quan li bao hu shi jiao de shui shou sifa gai ge
[Analysis of Tax Judicial Reform from the Perspective of the Protection of Taxpayers'
Rights], 8 INT'L TAX'N CHINA 26 (2006); Wang Hongmao, Na shui ren wen ti chu
lun [An Analysis of Taxpayer], 8 INT'L TAX'N CHINA 18 (2006); Lin Wensheng, Xin
<Qi ye suo de shui fa> zhong fan bi shui yi ban tiao kuan fa lv shi yong de kun
jing yu dui ce [Problems and Solutions of the Application of the General Anti- Tax
Avoidance Articles in the New Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People s Republic
of China], 8 TAX'N REs. 57 (2008).
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certainty and predictability for taxpayers, or in other words, the "loopholes"
can be identified and taken advantage of; (b) the taxpayer and the tax
administration are equal before the court and the court has the power of
interpretation; (c) taxpayers have no duty to pay tax in the absence of
clear obligations set forth in legislation and the right to tax minimization
is recognized in law; (d) under private (non-tax) law, taxpayers can use
different forms of legal arrangements to achieve the same economic results;
and (e) there is a reasonable level of transparency in tax compliance and
administration. These factors are currently lacking in China. The Chinese
style of tax law drafting makes it difficult for taxpayers to engage in the
kind of tax planning common in Canada. To begin with, the text of the law
does not often clearly define the boundaries between what is taxed and what
is not. While the Canadian income tax legislation occupies 2,500 pages, the
Chinese income tax legislation is no more than ten percent of that. Moreover,
while any legislative ambiguity is generally interpreted in favor of taxpayers
in Canada, the opposite might often be true in China. The "opaque" nature
of tax legislation makes it difficult for taxpayers to interpret the law and
avoid its literal application through tax planning. In China, tax minimization
has been achieved largely through tax evasion because the costs of "tax
evasion" are relatively lower, as they involve simply concealing information
as opposed to hiring tax advisers to construct tax-efficient legal structures.
The chance of being detected and punished is relatively small because of
personal connections between the taxpayer and tax officials," the common
85 Personal connections (guan xi) are prevalent in Chinese legal culture. For more
discussion, see STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA
AFTER MAO (2002); Pitman B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From
Contradiction to Complementarity, in SOCIAL CONNECTION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS,
CULTURE, AND THE CHANGINGNATURE OF GUANXI 179 (Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie
& David Wank eds., 2002). For a discussion of guan xi in the tax system, see Yang
Bin, supra note 80; Li Linping, supra note 80.
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interest of taxpayers and local government in minimizing taxes belonging to
central government, and the widespread incidence of tax evasion."
Absent the Canadian conditions, a logical conclusion would be that the
Chinese GAAR is redundant: there would be no reason to combat tax
avoidance in China through a statutory GAAR as the Chinese system lacks
the certainty and predictability necessary for such tax planning in the first
place. It is thus worthwhile to reiterate that the Chinese GAAR is top-down,
aimed to prevent abusive tax avoidance, as opposed to the Canadian GAAR
that is bottom-up, in reaction to adverse court decisions.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have attempted to explore the reasons why the GAAR,
though similar on paper, operates differently in Canada and China. The
inquiry has led to several observations about tax transplants and comparative
tax research. At one level, comparative tax research is similar to research on
domestic tax in that both require a high-level appreciation and understanding
of the broader legal, social and economic contexts. On the other hand,
because comparative tax research involves two or more countries, it is more
challenging in terms of language and access to information.
The level of sensitivity of tax rules to the local tax culture differs based
on the nature of the tax rule. One can imagine that the "universal" or
"scientific" rules, such as those based on accounting or market exchanges,
are less sensitive than those "indigenous" rules that reflect political or social
86 In principle, "national" taxes are collected by the local offices of the SAT, and
local taxes are collected by local tax bureaus. For example, income tax owed by
state-owned enterprises under the control of the central government is collected by
the SAT, while other types of domestic enterprises pay tax to the local tax bureaus.
Under the previous central planning model, enterprises were managed by different
levels of government. This legacy has been passed on to the current tax system.
Since there is only a weak supervisory role of the SAT and no effective system for
distributing and enforcing common policy, the SAT sometimes has to rely on more
clear and authoritative legislative rules to carry out its policies. There are many
cases of local government interference with the administration of taxation at local
levels. See XU SHANDA, RESEARCH ON CHINA'S TAXING POWER 135-36 (2003).
87 Many entrepreneurs prefer to evade laws rather than to fight for their enforcement.
See Huang Lei, Wo guo dangqian taobishui de zhuyan yuanyin yu duice [Major
Reasons ofChina ' Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance and Possible Counter Measures],
4 TAX'N REs. 67, 68 (2001) (in the late 1990s, fifty percent of large and medium
enterprises and over eighty percent of small private enterprises evaded taxes).
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values, such as progressivity, or tax expenditures for social programs."
Tax avoidance rules may fall in-between. There is some universal truth in
defining tax avoidance and singling out unacceptable avoidance transactions
for sanctions. This is particularly true in the case of anti-avoidance rules
for cross-border transactions. Yet, the effectiveness of transplanted tax rules
largely depends on their fit with the local tax culture. It is difficult to evaluate
the success of a transplant without a full understanding of the underlying tax
culture.
Tax culture is not static. In Canada, the GAAR arguably has brought some
changes to both how taxpayers approach tax avoidance and how the courts
interpret tax laws. It has caused some concern for the health of the Duke of
Westminster.89 Taxpayers need to consider whether their planned transactions
might run afoul of the GAAR. The courts have gradually moved away from the
strict, textual interpretation of tax laws. The Chinese GAAR seems to signal
some cultural changes as well. On the one hand, it sends a signal to taxpayers,
especially taxpayers conducting cross-border transactions, that China takes
tax avoidance seriously." On the other hand, the enactment of the GAAR
arguably signals to taxpayers that tax avoidance is permissible as long as it
does not offend the GAAR. In other words, transactions that have bona fide
commercial reasons, even if they result in tax savings, are valid. That may
encourage taxpayers to seek professional tax assistance in compliance and
planning and to expect more certainty and transparency in tax assessment.
Similar rules may produce significantly different effects in different
cultural contexts. The Canadian GAAR reduces the scope of tax planning in
Canada, whereas the Chinese GAAR arguably clarifies and "broadens" the
scope of tax planning. On the other hand, there is increasing convergence in
tax culture, which can be credited to some extent to the GAAR. Canadian
courts are interpreting tax law in a more purposive manner, an approach
more consistent with the way laws are interpreted in China. Limitations on
taxpayers' right to minimize taxation in Canada are moving the Canadian
system closer to the Chinese system, which has always valued collective
interest more than individual interest. In the meantime, the Chinese GAAR
88 For further discussion of the difficulties of implementing even accounting rules in
China, see Jin Li & Richard Krever, Globalization and Modernization as Drivers
for Tax Reform in the Socialist Market Economy, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 687
(2010).
89 In the Lipson (SCC) case, Justice Binnie asked: "How healthy is the Duke of
Westminster? There is cause for concern." Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3,
para. 54.
90 State Administration of Taxation, supra note 28.
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implicitly permits taxpayers to assert their right to tax minimization and to
demand more certainty and predictability in the Chinese tax system.
Overall, this Article barely scratches the surface of comparative tax
research and tax transplants. It will be fascinating to see whether similar
tax rules behave the same way in different countries and then explore the
reasons for such behavior.

